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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 30-2-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended): Homestead Rights - Custody of Children. Neither the 
husband nor wife can remove the other or their children from the 
homestead without the consent of the other, unless the owner of 
the property shall in good faith provide another homestead 
suitable to the condition in life of the family; and if a 
husband or wife abandones his or her spouse, that spouse is 
entitled to the custody of the minor children, unless a court of 
competent jurisdiction shall otherwise direct. 
Section 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
ammended): Custody of children in case of separation. In any 
case of separation of husband and wife having minor children, or 
whenever a marriage is declared void or dissolved the court 
shall make such order for the future care and custody of the 
minor children as it may deem just and proper. In determining 
custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the 
child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of 
each of the parties. The court may inquire of the children and 
take into consideration the children's desires regarding the 
future custody; however, such expressed desires shall not be 
controlling and the court may, nevertheless, determine the 
children's custody otherwise. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this action were married on May 2, 1968 
in Tucson, Arizona, At the time of the marriage, the Defendant 
was still a young girl, having just turned 16 years of age 
(Transcript-77, Line-24, hereinafter T-77,L-24). She was also 
four months pregnant. The parties1 first child, Darla, was born 
five months later on October 5, 1968. A second child, Beverly, 
was added to the family on February 20, 1970, and on October 
19, 1971, Stephen, Jr., the parties' third child, was born. 
Thus, after only three and one-half years of marriage, 
Defendant, at 19 years of age, was a mother of three. 
As a young wife, Defendant shouldered her heavy 
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responsibilities the best she could. However, instead of 
receiving help and support from Plaintiff, she found that he 
would rather spend time drinking with his friends (T-78,L-14). 
With three children to care for and no car, Defendant was forced 
to stay home. Her despair at this situation can clearly be seen 
by reading a letter she wrote to Plaintiff on September 13, 1984 
(Plaintiff's exhibit 8, pages 1 and 2), which contains a candid 
look at her reflections of that period. The Defendant's 
troubles were also compounded by rumors that Plaintiff had been 
unfaithful (T-78, L-23), and by the fact that on numerous 
occasions, she suffered beatings when Plaintiff would come home 
drunk (T-78,L-22). 
As time passed, the parties1 relationship continued to 
deteriorate. Plaintiff insisted on taking gambling trips and at 
one time stated his intention to become a professional 
gambler(T-80,L-19). To finance his gambling expeditions, family 
funds were utilized, and the Defendant and the children were 
again left home alone. To make matters worse, Defendant and the 
children were subjected to constant psychological abuse in which 
Plaintiff would assure them of their negligible self worth 
(T-33,L-6). 
In March of 1984, the family suffered a tragedy which 
put further pressure on the already faltering marriage. On that 
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date, the parties1 oldest daughter, Darla, attempted suicide by 
shooting herself in the head. She sustained severe head 
injuries, and has received ongoing therapy from a Salt Lake 
Neuropsychologist to help her deal with her emotional problems. 
The cause of this incident was found to be Darla's emotional 
volatility, and was found not the fault of either parent (T-58). 
In July of 1984, after Darla had made a rather 
miraculous recovery and was doing well (T-65,L-l-5), the 
relations between Defendant and Plaintiff became unbearable. 
Defendant, with the parties' fourth and youngest child, Jamie 
(born November 14, 1980), left the family home and traveled to 
Missouri in order to stay with Defendant's brother (T-84). 
During the trip, Defendant was accompanied by James Dvorak, a 
friend of the Alexander family, and whose presence with 
Defendant has caused much of the controversy surrounding this 
appeal. Defendant flatly denied any romantic or sexual 
involvment with Mr. Dvorak during this trip or thereafter 
(T-86,L-8). 
Defendant stayed in Missouri until March of 1985, at 
which time she returned to Utah unannounced (T-89,L-9). She 
found that the family home was filthy, and a friend who 
accompanied her stated that "...the house looked and smelled 
like a chicken coop. The carpet hadn't been swept or vacuumed 
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it looked like for several months...ff (T-105 ,L-15). They also 
found that Stephen, Jr. had been missing substantial amounts of 
school, and was barely passing his classes. 
Defendant subsequently returned to Missouri, and is 
currently residing with her mother and Jamie. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The decisions rendered by the Trial Court in divorce 
actions with respect to custody of children and the division of 
the marital assests and liabilities are presumed valid, and will 
be overturned on review only by showing that the court abused 
its discretion. Such a deference to the orders of the Trial 
Court is due to its favorable proximity to the parties, and its 
ability to observe the demeanor of witnesses. Upholding the 
rulings of the Trial Court is also important in custody disputes 
because a change of custody after a lengthy appeal would 
undermine the childs stability, and possibly cause more harm 
than good. 
In its decision regarding custody, the Trial Court did 
not err for the following reasons. First, there is ample 
evidence to support a conclusion that the Defendant is the 
person best able to care for the wants and needs of the child, 
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Jamie. Second, the Plaintiff presented no evidence that the 
Defendant's alleged affair harmed the minor child in any way; 
furthermore, there is adequate case law which supports the Trial 
Court's award even though the Court found that Defendant engaged 
in an affair. Finally, the Plaintiff mis-interprets the meaning 
of U.C.A., Section 30-2-10. The statute allows the Trial Court 
to make such custody orders as it deems proper in cases where a 
spouse has abandoned the other spouse. Thus, the Trial Court's 
custody award was merely a use of the discretion which the 
statute conferred on the Court. 
The award of the Trial Court with respect to the 
division of marital assets and liabilities was not an abuse of 
its discretion, and should be affirmed by this Court. The Trial 
Court's order that Plaintiff assume responsibility for payment 
of the marital debts was a proper use of the Court's discretion 
in such matters, and is supported in part, by the fact that the 
Defendant was not awarded alimony. The Trial Court properly 
refused to consider hypothetical tax consequences when valuing 
the Plaintiff's retirement account because such a valuation 
would be based on speculation, and would not involve a taxable 
event. Finally, the Trial Court correctly valued the assets of 
the marital estate at the time the marriage was terminated. 
Thus, the courts inclusion of contributions to the marital 
5 
estate which were made by the Plaintiff before the decreee was 
entered was just and proper, and supported by the law in this 
State. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS BROAD DISCRETION IN 
MAKING ORDERS REGARDING THE CUSTODY OF 
CHILDREN AND THE DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS. 
The standard of review to be applied to the Trial 
Court's rulings in divorce matters has been well settled. From 
the decisions of this Court throughout the years, four distinct 
standards have become apparent. They are as follows: 
1. A presumption of validity is placed upon the Trial 
Court's actions in divorce matters. Berger v. Berger, Utah, 14 
Ut. Ad. Rep. 4,5 (1985) ; 
2. The burden is on the Appellant to show error, and 
the Trial Court's findings of fact will be overturned only if 
they are contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence. 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P.2d 1218,22 (1980); 
3. The Trial Court's judgment will be overturned where 
there has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in a substantial and prejudicial error. Harding v. 
Harding, 26 Utah 2d 273,280, 488 P.2d 308,310 (1971); and 
4. Where there has been such an abuse of discretion 
that an inequity or injustice has resulted. Jorgenson v. 
7 
Jorgenson, Utah, 599 P.2d 510,512 (1979). 
As can be seen from the above tests, the reviewing court 
places a high degree of confidence in the Trial Court's 
determination. This is doubtless due to the Trial Court's 
favorable proximity to the parties. The trial judge is able to 
see the parties and judge their demeanor, maturity and quality 
firsthand. The benefit of such observations in making the 
decisions attendant to divorce actions is obvious. Stuber v. 
Stuber, 121 Ut. 632, 244 P.2d 650, (1952). The Oregon Supreme 
Court, in Bennehoff v. Bennehoff, 209 Or. 224, 225-26, 304 P.2d 
1079 (1956) made this observation: 
...In the difficult and delicate task of 
attempting to determine where the welfare of 
children lies as between conflicting claims 
of warring parents, the judge who sees the 
parties and their witnesses and listens to 
their testimony has a position of advantage 
over the justices of this court. This axiom 
of appellate court review, so often referred 
to in equity suits, is of prime importance 
in its application to a child custody case 
which involves, as does this one, an 
appraisal of the character, temperment, and 
disposition of the contending parents, some 
of the determining marks of which may reveal 
themselves to one who sees and observes the 
persons concerned but are not to be found 
in the typewritten pages of a cold record. 
The decision of the trial judge in such a 
case is, therefore, not to be lightly set 
aside. 
Another, and perhaps even more important reason why the 
decision of the Trial Court should be given so much weight is 
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the importance of maintaining stability in the lives of 
children. In his dissenting opinion to this Court's ruling in 
Shioji v. Shioji, 23 Ut. Adv. Rep. 4,7 (11/27/85), Justice 
Zimmerman made some very pertinent observations as to the 
potential harm children face when custodial arrangements are 
changed. Two points brought out in the opinion deserve special 
attention here. First, lfa child needs a continuing relationship 
with the person who cares for him, and any time that continuity 
is broken, the child suffers.ff Shioji, at p. 9, citing Whaley 
v. Whaley, 61 Ohio App. 2nd 111, 399 N.E.2nd 1270, 1272 (1978), 
and second, the observation by Dean Hafen, of the J. Rueben 
Clark School of Law, that when ffthe state" disrupts the 
relationship of child-parent, even when their appears to be 
inadequate parental care, more harm than good is frequently 
done. Shioji, at p.9. 
In the instant case, the Defendant and the parties three 
and one-half year old child, Jamie, left the family home in July 
of 1984. They have been together ever since, and will continue 
to reside together throughout the pendency of this appeal. 
Since the time for processing an appeal with this Court now 
takes between two and three years, it is very possible that when 
a final decision is made, the child will have resided with the 
Defendant for a period of over three years. During this period, 
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the child will undoubtedly fall into a stable living pattern and 
become comfortable in her surroundings. To make a change at 
that late date would almost certainly cause a major trauma in 
the child's life, and as Dean Hafen stated above, more harm 
could be done than good. 
The child should not have to suffer for this Court's 
large backload of cases and the subsequent delay in resolving 
cases. It is very possible that the child could be taken out of 
a stable, loving environment and placed in one entirely opposite 
- all based on facts up to and over 3 years old, and without any 
consideration of the present circumstances of the parties. For 
these reasons, this Court should defer to the decision of the 
Trial Court, and require that any change of custody be 
undertaken by a petition for modification where current facts 
and circumstances of the parties could be reviewed in full. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN MAKING ITS AWARD OF CUSTODY. 
The standard to be used in determining the custody of 
children in divorce cases is found in the Utah Code, Section 
30-3-10. This section states that fl...The court shall make such 
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orders for the future care and custody of the minor children as 
it may deem just and proper. In determining custody, the court 
shall consider the best interests of the child...tf A review of 
the evidence will clearly show that the Trial Court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding Defendant custody of Jamie, and 
that such an award was in the best interests of the children. 
A. THE CUSTODY AWARD IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
In a case such as this, where both parties are at fault 
and the dissolution of the marriage came about gradually 
throughout the parties 17 years together, numerous factors must 
be considered in determining ,fthe best interests of the child11. 
The following is a discussion of some relevant factors the Trial 
Court examined in reaching its conclusion: 
1. The Defendant is well trained in raising and caring 
for children. 
Since the parties married in 1968, the Defendant has had 
the responsibility of caring for, and tending to the needs of 
the parties children. Kay Askee, a friend of both the Defendant 
and Plaintiff, whose relationship with the family spanned a 
period of five - six years, and who has been in the family home 
many times, testified that the condition of the home was ,fkept 
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very well1' and that in her opinion, the Defendant was a good 
housekeeper (T-109,L-11). Defendant's capacity as an able 
homemaker and mother is further set out in the testimony of 
Roger Carrender. When Defendant first moved to Missouri, she 
was offered the job of caring for Mr, Carrenderfs son who was 
afflicted with Terats Syndrome (T-100,L-19). Mr. Carrender 
rented an apartment some distance from his home in a school 
district which was specially equipped to handle his son's 
disability. He hired Defendant to stay with and look after the 
boy since his work took him out of town for long periods of time 
(T-101,L-6). Also residing in the apartment was Mr. Carrenderfs 
fiance, to whom he married two weeks following the trial. Mr. 
Carrender did not reside in the apartment, nor did he have any 
romantic involvement with the Defendant (T-102,L12). Mr. 
Carrender had this to say about the care his son received from 
the Defendant (T-101,L-20): 
Q - How has she done? 
MR. CARRENDER - She has made more progress 
with the child in seven months than the 
other 200 people I've tried have done in 
seven years. 
Q - Does she keep the house tidy? 
MR. CARRENDER - Immaculate. 
The evidence paints a bleak picture of Plaintiff's 
abilities as a homemaker. Obviously, Plaintiff has not 
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concentrated in that area because he has spent much of his time 
away from the home engaging in his career. However, upon 
returning to Utah with the Defendant in March of 1985, Mr. Roger 
Carrender gave the following testimony of the condition of the 
family home (T-105 ,L-14): 
Q - Can you tell the court what you 
observed? 
MR. CARRENDER: When I first walked into the 
door, a bird cage was there with some kind 
of quail. The house looked and smelled like 
a chicken coop. The carpet hadn't been 
swept or vacuumed it looked for several 
months. 
The kitchen was clutterd with trash. 
Several days dishes on the counter. I 
walked in, you could see in the bedroom from 
the front room there was clothes hanging out 
of every dresser drawer, on the bed. I 
don't think there could have been a clean 
clothes in the house. 
In his findings, Judge Cornaby mentioned this testimony, 
and warned Plaintiff that if such standards were maintained, 
they would be grounds for losing custody. Judge Cornaby stated 
as follows (T-134,L-4): 
I'm aware, too, that I can't ignore 
the testimony, Mr. Alexander, that try like 
you would, you may not be maintaining the 
kind of cleanliness of a home that needs to 
be for raising the three children you've 
got. 
I recognize it's only your wife and her 
friends that have testified to those things. 
They say their of a negative nature. 
If they're as bad as they testified 
to, there would be grounds for not allowing 
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you to have custody of the three older 
children. But you're the only one that is a 
practical person to have custody of those 
three older children, and if the home was as 
bad as it's been testified to on the day 
that your wife went in on March 1985, then 
I'm assuming that was not a normal 
condition. 
The unannounced visit also shed some light on the 
Plaintiff's supervision of the children there residing. Upon 
visiting the home during school hours, Stephen, Jr., the parties 
14 year old son was found present. Mr. Carrender, upon 
questioning him as to his absence from school received the 
following explanation (T-106,L-4): 
Q - Was there any reason why he was there? 
MR. CARRENDER: I took him outside and 
talked with him for about an hour, and he 
said the reason he had stayed home was 
because his dad asked him to stay up the 
night before and tape a movie for him and he 
was tired. 
Defendant became concerned about her sons absence, and 
thereafter went to the school to inquire as to his academic 
status. She found that his absences totaled 15 days as compared 
to a total of 13 days during the preceding four years. His 
Grade Point Average was listed as .85 for the most recent term 
(Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2). 
2. Defendant is best suited to care for Jamie. 
As has already been stated, Defendant and Jamie have 
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been together continuosly since they left Utah in 1984. Before 
that time, Defendant was the major caretaker of Jamie, and 
consequently, spent a great deal more time with the child than 
did the Plaintiff. It follows that the Defendant would be in a 
much better position to respond to the wants and needs of the 
young child. 
Although Judge Cornaby recognized that there had been 
some instability in Defendant's life, he found that such 
instability did not cause her to be an unfit mother for custody-
purposes. In his findings, Judge Cornaby stated (T-141-142): 
Now, I haven't found the Defendant to be an 
unfit mother. I didn't say she was an unfit 
mother any more than I said the Plaintiff 
was an unfit father, but I think that as 
between the two, I think you both have some 
problems in raising kids. Part of the 
Plaintiff's problem is because he's spent 
most of his married life earning a living, 
not raising children. And though I find --
I'm saying there's some instability. I 
recognize that instability in the 
Defendant's life. I'm not saying that its 
such an instability that it creates her from 
being a fit parent for that one child, and 
of all the children to award to her, that's 
obviously to the Court the best division the 
Court can make. 
The reasonableness of Judge Cornaby's findings can also 
be supported by the fact that Jamie is ten and one-half years 
younger than the next oldest child, Stephen, Jr.. As such, it 
could not be expected that Jamie would always have one of her 
15 
older brothers or sisters as a playmate or caretaker, especially 
in light of the fact that all three of the older children are 
going through their teenage years and will surely have interests 
other than caring for a minor child. 
3. Defendant has established a plan for the care of the 
child. 
Defendant testified that her mother will be living with 
her, and will be able to care for the child while Defendant is 
at school or work (T-93,L-3). This arrangement is doubtless 
more satisfactory than that planned by Plaintiff. Plaintiff 
stated as follows concerning his plans for the care of the 
children (T-32,L-2): 
Q - If you were to have custody of her 
[Jamie], what would your plans of care be? 
A - I've already checked into putting her 
into child care with Young World which is in 
the same block I live on, or with a mother 
who has children her age. 
Q - So, therfore, your plans for her 
basically involve day care of some sort? 
A - That's correct. 
Q - Now, your other children are in schools 
here in Millcreek Junior High; is that 
correct? 
A - Two are in junior high; one is in high 
school. 
Q - Who will supervise them between the time 
that they return home from school and the 
16 
time that you return home from work? Have 
you made plans for that? 
A - They supervise theirselves until I get 
home, and do a very adequate job of it. 
There should be no question that receiving care from a 
mother or grandmother would be superior to that of day care. 
Further, the evidence already shown regarding Plaintiff's 
supervision of the children makes his assertion that the 
children will supervise themselves hard to believe. As has been 
shown, Stephen Jr. 's supervision of himself included not going 
to school and staying up late on a school night (T-106,L-4). 
4. Dr. Nilssonfs findings are suspect, and should be 
weighed accordingly. 
Dr. Nilsson, the Neuropsychologist who treated Darla 
following her suicide attempt, concluded that Plaintiff should 
be awarded custody of all four of the parties children because 
of the Defendant's instability. His findings are suspect for 
the following reasons: 
First, his acquaintance with Defendant was during a 
short five month period based upon 15-20 one hour visits which 
included Darla and sometimes the entire family. Thus, his 
attention was not exclusively fixed on the Defendant. This 
small amount of time was also during the most traumatic, 
stressful period of the marriage, that of Darla1s suicide 
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attempt. When asked about the trauma parents suffer as a result 
of a suicide attempt by one of their children, Dr. Nilsson 
stated (T-62,L-15): 
Q - Now, Dr. Nilsson, as far as a trauma 
that the parents are faced with, in your 
opinion, where does an attempted suicide of 
a child range on a scale of one to ten, with 
one as least traumatic and ten the most 
traumatic? 
A - If d say ten 
Q - Very, very traumatic? Very stressful 
event? 
A - Yes. 
Q - You never did have contact with Diane 
Alexander before the time of Darla's 
attempted suicide, did you? 
A - No, my first contact with her was 
when—when she was in the hospital. 
Q - Right. So, therefore, your exposure to 
Diane has been one where Diane has been 
under a tremendous amount of stress? 
A - Yes. 
Dr. Nilsson further testified that Defendant would have 
suffered additional stress because she found Darla immediately 
after the shooting and because she had no close family members 
to lean on at the time (T-63,L-13). 
Second, Dr. Nilsson admitted that he had given the 
parents no type of objective testing to inquire as to their 
personalities (T-61,L-17), that he had never been inside of the 
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family home (T-70,L-2), and that he was hired only for the 
purpose of helping Darla, and not to counsel the parties as to 
their marriage (T-59,L11). He further admitted that any 
information he received about Defendant after she left Utah in 
July of 1984 came from the Plaintiff or the children, not from 
his personal observations (T-61,L-8). 
Finally, when pressed as to what it would take for the 
Defendant to be able to have custody of the children, Dr. 
Nilsson stated (T-70,L-6): 
A - Demonstrated stability, consistency. 
Right now, frankly, it would take her 
talking the children into living with her. 
Q - But if she were to have a stable 
environment, you wouldn't be against having 
her have the custody of the children? 
A - If there was some demonstrated track 
record of stability... 
Defendant has since satisfied the concerns of Dr. 
Nilsson. She is now away from the major source of her 
instability - Plaintiff. She is not faced with the traumatic 
incident of a child's suicide or a crumbling marriage - two 
events which few people have to endure at the same time. 
As has been set forth above, the Trial Court had ample 
evidence to support its custody award. The award has not 
resulted in an injustice nor has the Plaintiff overcome the 
presumption of validity which the court's ruling enjoys. 
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Accordingly, this Court should uphold the order of the Trial 
Court respecting custody of the children, 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT DEFENDANT 
HAD AN AFFAIR DOES NOT AFFECT THE VALIDITY 
OF ITS CUSTODY AWARD. 
Although it is true that the Trial Court found that 
Defendant had had an affair with another man, such an act, by 
itself, does not mean that the Trial Court abused its discretion 
in awarding Defendant custody of Jamie, The law respecting this 
subject is found in a series of cases which start with Stuber v. 
Stuber, 121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650 (1952). In Stuber, at p. 
637, this Court found that ,fthe fact that she lived with a man 
whom she expected to marry, although censurable, does not in 
itself make her an improper person to have the custody of her 
child.M The law in other states is similar. In In the matter 
of the Marraige of Whitlow, Or. App., 550 P.2d 1404,6, (1976), 
the court found that the wife's single brief affair did not 
establish her as an unfit parent, and further stated that ffThere 
was no evidence that the affair itself had a detrimental effect 
on the child." In the 1985 case of Wall v. Wall, Utah, 700 
P.2d 1284 (1985), this Court upheld a custody award to the 
mother, despite the fact that the mother's boyfriend 
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occasionally spent the night with the mother and her son. This 
Court accepted the Trial Court's findings that no indiscretion 
occurred in the child's presence and therefore upheld the award. 
In all of these cases, the key element seems to be 
whether or not the extramarital conduct was carried on in the 
presence of the child and if the conduct was shown to be 
detrimental to the child. Unless this is shown, a change of 
custody is not warranted. In the present case, there is no 
evidence whatsoever that Defendant's extramarital relations, if 
any, had any adverse effect on Jamie. Although James Dvorak 
admitted that he, Defendant and Jamie had shared the same bed, 
there was no evidence that any kind of romantic or sexual 
activity was carried on in the presence of the child, nor did 
Plaintiff show or attempt to show that Jamie had been harmed in 
anyway from the incident. Without any evidence of the above, 
this Court should give deference to the findings of the Trial 
Court and affirm its custody award. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE 
PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. 30-2-10 WHEN MAKING ITS 
CUSTODY AWARD. 
Section 30-2-10 of the Utah Code provides as follows: 
Neither the husband nor wife can remove 
the other or their children from the 
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homestead without the consent of the other, 
unless the owner of the property shall in 
good faith provide another homestead 
suitable to the condition in life of the 
family; and if a husband or wife abandones 
his or her spouse, that spouse is entitled 
to the custody of the minor children, unless 
a court of competent jurisdiction shall 
otherwise direct. 
Although the Trial Court found that Defendant abandoned 
the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff is wrong in his interpretation of 
the statute. The Plaintiff neglects the last nine words of the 
statute which provide "unless a court of competent jurisdiction 
shall otherwise direct.ff The Trial Court did just that in this 
case. Since the Statute allows a Trial Court to use its 
discretion in abandonement cases, the Trial Court's award in the 
instant case was a legitimate use of its discretion in such 
matters, and was therefore not an abuse of discretion. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIVIDED THE 
OBLIGATIONS AND PROPERTY OF THE MARRIAGE. 
As in a custody award, the Trial Court is accorded great 
discretion in dividing the assets and liabilities of the 
marriage. This Court stated in Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 
P.2d 1218 (1980) that: 
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There is no fixed formula upon which to 
determine a division of property, it is a 
prerogative of the court to make whatever 
disposition of property as it deems fair, 
equitable, and necessary for the protection 
and welfare of the parties. In the division 
of marital property, the trial judge has 
wide discretion, and his findings will not 
be disturbed unless the record indicates an 
abuse thereof. 
In reviewing the Trial Court's order as it pertains to 
the division of assets and liabilities, this Court should take 
into consideration the fact that the Trial Judge did not award 
the Defendant alimony (T-136,L-23). The refusal to award 
alimony in this case played a major part in the courts division 
of assets and obligations. This is plainly evident from the 
following excerpt from the record (T-139 ,L-11): 
MR. LINDSLEY: Did your honor take into 
account the debts and subtracting them from 
the total value of the marriage? 
THE COURT: No, I didn't. I took that into 
account in deciding whether or not he ought 
to pay alimony. Normally, with a 17-year 
marriage, in a situation like this, you'd 
probably expect the Plaintiff to pay three 
or four or five hundred dollars a month for 
a period of two or three years to help the 
other party get on some kind of equivalent 
buying power, and I haven't done it 
partially balancing out these equities 
between the parties, and partially because 
she chose to walk away from the marriage in 
the way she did. 
The refusal to grant alimony in a case where the 
marriage lasted 17 years, where the Defendant was 16 years old 
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at the time of marriage, had only a tenth grade education, and 
has not furthered her education or trained for any skill since 
that time, should not be taken lightly. Accordingly, the Trial 
Court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the assets and 
providing for payment of the marital liabilities. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
CONSIDER HYPOTHETICAL TAX LIABILITIES WHEN 
PLACING A VALUE ON THE PLAINTIFF'S 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNT. 
The Trial Court properly refused to reduce the value of 
Plaintiff's retirement account by hypothetical amounts of tax 
because the valuation did not cause a taxable event, and any 
effort to determine the future tax liability would be mere 
speculation. In Gilbert v. Gilbert, Mont. 628 P.2d 1088, 
(1981), the Montana Supreme Court was faced with this same 
issue. The court stated: 
We find, however, that the property 
distribution ordered by the District Court 
includes no presently taxable events and 
triggers no tax liability. The District 
Court did not abuse its discretion by 
refusing to consider the theoretical income 
tax consequences of a present liquidation 
which is neither necessary nor probable, but 
merely conjectural. 
This same conclusion has been upheld in the following 
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jurisdictions: Re Marriage of Johnson, 106 111. App. 3rd 502, 
62 111. Dec. 478, 436 N.E.2d 228 (1982); Re Marriage of Hayne, 
334 N.W. 2d 347, Iowa App. (1983); In re Marriage of Sharp, 143 
Cal. App. 3d 714, 192 Cal Rptr 97, 4th Dist. (1983); Re Marriage 
of Miller, 112 111. App. 3d 203, 68 111. Dec. 167, 445 N.E. 2d 
811 (1983); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 657 P.2d 646 (1983); 
Wallahan v. Wallahan, 284 N.W. 2d 21 (1979 S. Dakota); In re 
Marriage of Beck, Montana, 631 P.2d 282 (1981). 
Because the great weight of authority is against 
reducing the value of marital property by amounts representing 
hypothetical future taxation, the Trial Court did not abuse its 
discretion in doing the same. Under the circumstances, and 
especially in light of its refusal to award alimony, the ruling 
of the Trial Court was just and proper. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO PAY THE 
LIABILITIES OF THE MARRAIGE. 
As was earlier stated, the Trial Court's order that 
Plaintiff pay the liabilities of the marriage was taken into 
consideration when the Court decided not to award the Defendant 
alimony. Such an act was clearly within the province of the 
Trial Court, and therefore, not an abuse of discretion. 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY VALUATED THE 
MARITAL ESTATE. 
This Court has made clear that the marital estate is 
evaluated according to what property existed at the time the 
marriage terminated. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218,22, Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, Utah, 610 P.2d 326,328 (1980). In this case, the 
marriage was terminated on April 22, 1985, and therefore, 
valuation of the property held by the parties at that time would 
be a proper function of the Trial Court. Accordingly, the Trial 
Court did not abuse its discretion by including in the value of 
the marital estate those contributions made by Plaintiff after 
the parties were separated. It should be noted that this is not 
a case in which the parties were separated a long period before 
the divorce action was initiated. The parties separated on July 
18, 1984 (See Record, P.11, hereinafter, R-ll), and the divorce 
was instituted on August 13, 1984 (R-l), less than one month 
later. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court was reasonable and proper in its 
determination of the issues in this case. Through the use of 
its broad discretion and its observation of the demeanor of the 
parties and their witnesses, the court entered a decree which 
was both in the best interests of the children, and which also 
provided for the future welfare and well being of the parties. 
The Plaintiff has not rebutted the presumption of validity that 
this Court places on the Trial Court's rulings in divorce 
matters. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the order of the 
Trial Court which is the subject of this review. 
DATED this 7 ^ - 3ay of P<£c£Mj?^, 1985. 
JAMES B. HANKS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
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